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ABSTRACT 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks provide a structure-less environment, enabling 
participants in the coverage mobile nodes to communicate each other without using 
any centralized authentication agent.  Thus, it is compromised in face to various sorts 
of attacks.  Unfortunately, none of the presented secured routing protocols can detect 
internal Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by itself naturally.  One of the most 
important and effective internal misbehaviors which has dramatic side effects on the 
network’s throughput is Flooding Attack.  This project aims at proposing an 
alternative solution to detect and respond Flooding Attack in MANET which is based 
on cooperative trust evaluation mechanisms.  Actually, this approach is matched to 
basic principles of distributed networks in which the participating nodes are 
responsible for any needed creation, operation and maintenance of the network. 
Moreover, it seems useful for high mobility networks where the suspicious nodes 
move around the area repeatedly.  Consequently, the gained results of the project 
prove that the proposed Trust-based Cooperation mechanisms decreases the side 
effects of Flooding Attack on Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol. 
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ABSTRAK 
 Rangkaian Segera Bergerak (Mobile Adhoc Network) menyediakan 
persekitaran kurang berstruktur, membolehkan pengguna yang berada di dalam 
kawasan liputan untuk berkomunikasi di antara satu sama lain tanpa menggunakan 
sebarang agen pengesahan berpusat. Oleh itu, ia mampu berhadapan dengan pelbagai 
jenis serangan. Malangnya, tiada satu pun protokol laluan keselamatan tersebut dapat 
mengesan Denial of Service (DOS) dalaman yang diserang oleh diri sendiri secara 
semulajadi. Di antara kepentingan dan keberkesanan tingkahlaku dalaman yang 
memberi kesan sampingan kepada laluan rangkaian ialah Serangan Banjir ( Flooding 
Attack). Projek ini bertujuan untuk mencari penyelesaian alternatif bagi mengesan 
dan bertindakbalas dengan Serangan Banjir dalam MANET yang mana ia 
berteraskan mekanisma penilaian kepercayaan kerjasama. Sebenarnya, pendekatan 
ini berpadanan dengan asas prinsip kepada rangkaian yang beredar / bergerak di 
mana node atau laluan yang turut serta adalah bertanggungjawab kepada sebarang 
keperluan yang dicipta, pengoperasian dan penyelenggaraan kepada rangkaian. 
Selain itu, ia sangat berguna untuk rangkaian bergerak yang tinggi di mana node 
yang mencurigakan bergerak mengelilingi kawasan tersebut secara berulang-ulang. 
Kesimpulannya, hasil keputusan yang diperolehi dari projek ini membuktikan 
bahawa cadangan mekanisma Trust-based Cooperation dapat mengurangkan kesan 
sampingan Serangan Banjir (Flooding Attack) kepada protokol laluan On-Demand 
Distance Vector. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Today, Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) have been popular because of its 
exclusive characteristics which have allowed wireless devices to connect each other 
easily when fall in the radio coverage of each other [1].  Also, each node performs 
the roles of an end-system and works also as a router to forward packet through the 
network; therefore, mobile ad hoc network uses the concept of multi hop 
communication.  In addition, every node can move in the network freely. This 
mobility is as a result of dynamic topology in MANET without any infrastructure 
requirements such as centralized access point or centralized administration.  As a 
result, each node is in charge of its security threats [2].  Actually, the lack of 
infrastructure in MANET nominates this kind of networks for using wherever the 
implementation of network infrastructure is impossible or too expensive such as 
military usages, emergency applications, PDA networking, and usual applications 
such as wireless meeting or classroom. 
MANET uses routing protocols to route packets to destination like the 
conventional wired networks which are divided into PRP (Proactive Routing 
Protocol) and RRP (Reactive Routing Protocol) [3, 4].  Proactive Routing Protocols 
is called Table Driven Routing Protocol too. In PRP the routing information of all 
nodes are stored by the others, and routing updates are propagated whenever the 
topology of the network changes [5].  Another side, in the case of RRP, route 
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between the nodes is searched only whenever a source node wants to communicate 
with the others; they use Flooding method to discover the route by sending route 
request message which will be replied by the purposed destination.  But the method 
of on-demand routing to facilitate route discovery may be used by the Intruders or 
the malicious node to consume the network resources, leading to Flooding attack [6, 
7]. 
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows; the second section will 
be discussed problem background, subsequently, problem statement will be 
described; the rest of the chapter is allocated for the objectivity of the project and its 
scope; finally, significant of the project and references are cited.   
1.2 Problem background 
According to properties of MANET, especially the lack of network 
infrastructure such as centralized administration, every node consists of many sorts 
of attacks; mostly, denial of service attacks.  Although, using RRPs (On demand 
Routing Protocols) have irrefutable benefits for mobile ad hoc network, however, 
they increases the risk of DoS attacks.  
Actually, like conventional wired networks, MANET uses routing protocols 
to forward packets to the destination; Proactive routing protocols also, known as 
table-driven protocols is based on routing table between nodes.  However, the main 
advantage of Proactive routing protocols can be declared as predictability of the 
control over head on these protocols; since it has a fixed upper bound which enables 
it to be independent to the traffic profiles [22].  In contrary, as disadvantages, we can 
state that they are not scalable perfectly and maintenance of routing table requires 
substantial network resources [20].  On the other hand, Reactive routing protocols or 
on-demand routing protocols are developed for MANET to direct packets to the 
destination.  In fact they indicate the real basis of MANET which provides more 
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dynamic networks in comparison with structured ones.  In the on demand routing 
protocols, nodes search for a route when they want to communicate with each other.  
To discover the routes they use route discovery procedure which in turns uses the 
Flooding method.  Therefore, updating of the routing information is presented 
whenever a node requires a route instead of periodically updating the route 
information.  Consequently, the control overhead will be reduced, especially in high 
mobility networks where the periodical update causes significant waste overhead 
[22].  However, on demand, routing protocols are categorized into secured on 
demand routing protocols such as SAODV [29], SEAD [32], SRP [21], ARAN [2], 
and Adriane [30].  And non-secure on demand routing protocols such as AODV [11] 
and DSR [23].  According to the studies, AODV is one of the most popular routing 
protocols for implementing additional DoS Attack detection modules because of its 
dynamic structure and perfect performance [12, 13]. 
In fact, MANET Flooding Attack is known as a harmful DoS attack which 
affects on functionality of almost all RRPs sharply.  Mobile Ad hoc Flooding attack 
makes it possible for an adversary to carry out DoS by saturating the support with a 
quantity of broadcasting messages, by reducing the output of nodes, and in the worst 
case, to prevent them from communicating.  In fact, there is similar attack in 
conventional wired networks which is popularly called SYN Flooding attack.  In this 
attack, the attacker sends many TCP connection requests with spoofed source 
addresses to a victim.  As a result, the resources of the victim host will be exhausted; 
subsequently, no more incoming TCP connection can be established by this machine 
[8]. 
Before describing Flooding Attack in MANET, it seems necessary to describe 
more about on-demand protocols especially AODV [11] which this project is relied 
on.  AODV is one of the on-demand routing protocols, designed for MANET to 
manage unicast, multicast, and broadcast announcement.  Actually, AODV is 
developed by using some principles of DSR [23] and DSDV [24] which are route 
discovery and route preservation from DSR and hop by hop steering sequence 
number and sporadic beacons from DSDV, respectively.   
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Actually, Flooding attack in MANET is categorized to two types which are 
Route Request (RREQ) Flooding attack and Data Flooding attack [8].  In RREQ 
Flooding attack the attacker broadcasts many route requests without consider to 
Rate-Limit, roundtrip-time, and Back-off-time.  On the other hand, Data Flooding 
Attack occurs when an attacker creates a communication path with a victim node; 
and in the next step sends a huge amount of useless data packets to it to exhaust 
recourses of all intermediate nodes and waste bandwidth of the network.  Because of 
the authentication methods implemented in on-demand protocols, the intermediate 
nodes cannot understand the contents of the packets, but they can just forward them 
to the destination; therefore, no one can detect data Flooding attack except the 
application layer of destination node [8]. 
Many valued efforts for sure have been tried to mitigate Flooding attack in 
MANET by using vary approaches such as FAP [8], AMTT [14], Filtering scheme 
[9, 10], and Trust scheme; but consequently, it seems that none of the mentioned 
mechanisms could solve Flooding attack in MANET totally.  In fact, each of them 
has its specific limitations to solve both types Flooding Attack which will be 
described comprehensively in the rest of this article.  However, this project proposes 
an alternative trust based scheme which is combination of related solution’s strength 
and it is relied on cooperation between friend nodes.  The main idea of this approach 
is coming from a friendship based framework  [44, 45];  in the proposed scheme, we 
try to collect trust values from two ways as direct trust estimation and indirect trust 
value (Recommended trust) which are coming from friend neighboring nodes with a 
coefficient value that indicates their efficiency level in the decisions. 
1.3 Problem statement 
Although, Flooding Attack does not use any complex process to flood 
network, but the secured routing protocols cannot detect this attack naturally.  This 
research tries to use a trust based mechanism to response route request Flooding 
Attack in MANET according to neighbor suppression approach.  Moreover, 
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cooperative mechanism to collect information about suspicious nodes can restrict 
them for long term in the virtual societies greatly; then the problem of stranger nodes 
in high mobility situations can be solved too.  Furthermore, this cooperation is based 
on both direct and indirect trust evaluation approach which is introduced as a suitable 
approach for distributed networks such as MANET or WSN [38].  This research will 
tries to show that cooperation of friend nodes can develop a trusted set of nodes 
which can help to each other to make the best decision about a suspicious node and 
limiting its capabilities to Flooding area by using both direct trust calculating and 
recommended (indirect) trust computing simultaneously.   
1.4  Aim of the project 
This project tries to detect MANET Flooding attack by proposing a trust 
based mechanism as an alternative solution and also response side effects of this 
internal misbehavior. 
1.5  Objectives of the project 
In order to mentioned aims of the project, the objectives of the project related 
to flooding problem in MANET are stated as below: 
 To analyze existing problems and solutions in MANET, related to 
Flooding attacks. 
 To design alternative solution for MANET Flooding attack problem by 
using trust based mechanisms. 
 To evaluate trust based Flooding Attack detection and response 
mechanisms for Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol. 
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1.6  Scope of project 
The scope of this project is defined as following: 
 Evaluations will be conducted only in simulation. 
 Trust based Flooding Attack detection and response mechanisms will be 
compared with the original AODV routing protocol. 
1.7  Significance of the study 
The outcome of the project is to detect route request Flooding attack by using 
an enterprise trust based mechanism which controls active nodes of MANET to 
detect and response Flooding Attack. Actually, this method works as a friendship 
system to identify suspicious senders for long term and decrease the side effects of 
their attacks by monitoring their propagation. This project aims at introducing an 
alternative trust based mechanism to record background activities of vicious nodes 
and setup a plural opinion system for recognizing strangers in high mobility 
situation.  
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